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In the last decade it has become en vogue for cognitive comparative psychologists to 
study animal behavior in an ‘integrated’ fashion to account for both the ‘innate’ and the 
‘acquired’. We will argue that these studies, instead of really integrating the concepts of 
‘nature’ and ‘nurture’, rather cement this old dichotomy. They combine empty nativist 
interpretation of behavior systems with blatantly environmentalist explanations of 
learning. We identify the main culprit as the failure to take development seriously. While 
in some areas of biology interest in the relationship between behavior and development 
has surged through topics such as extragenetic inheritance, niche construction, and 
phenotypic plasticity, this has gone almost completely unnoticed in the study of animal 
behavior in comparative psychology, and is frequently ignored in ethology too. The main 
aims of this paper are to clarify the relationship between the concepts of learning, 
experience, and development, and to investigate whether and how all three concepts can 
be usefully deployed in the study of animal behavior. This will require the full integration 
of the psychological study of behavior into biology, and of the idea of learning into a 
wider concept of experience. We lay out how, in a systems view of development, 
learning may just appear as one among many processes in which experience influences 
behavior. This new synthesis should help to overcome the age-old dualism between 
innate and acquired. It thereby opens up the possibility of developing scientifically more 
fruitful distinctions. 
 
1. Introduction  
Animal behavior has been the contested subject of study between two quite distinct 
disciplines. For several decades in the middle of the last century the ethological tradition 
in Europe and the psychological tradition in America fought an intellectual war in whose 
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center stood the ‘instinct’ concept (Griffiths 2004). Tinbergen’s acceptance of some of 
the major criticisms of this concept and then Robert Hinde’s remaking of ethology in the 
sixties officially put an end to the war. Nevertheless, both traditions remained largely 
separated in the fields of behavioral ecology, sociobiology, evolutionary psychology and 
cognitive ethology on the one hand and comparative psychology on the other. While the 
former disciplines were mainly interested in the species-typical behavior of animals in 
their natural habitat and the evolutionary contexts in which different behavioral 
phenotypes are selected, the latter focused on general mechanisms of learning in tightly 
controlled conditions. The main differences between the two fields were their 
methodology, field studies versus laboratory experiments, and their subject of study, 
innate versus acquired behavior. In the last decade it has become en vogue for cognitive 
comparative psychologists to study animal behavior in an ‘integrated’ fashion: While the 
acquisition of knowledge remains the primary target of scientifically rigorous 
investigation, the natural habitat and evolutionary endowment of the organism are taken 
into account, and explanations are sought at both the behavioral and the cognitive level.  
 
We will argue that these studies, instead of really integrating the concepts of ‘nature’ and 
‘nurture’, rather cement this old dichotomy. They combine empty nativist interpretation 
of behavior systems with blatantly environmentalist explanations of learning, based on 
the assumption that ‘the innate must be there before learning begins’. The main culprit, 
identified by Lehrman more than half a century ago, is the failure to really take 
development seriously if it is taken into account at all (Lehrman 1953). While in some 
areas of biology interest in the relationship between behavior and development has 
surged through topics such as parental effects, extragenetic inheritance, and phenotypic 
plasticity, this has gone almost completely unnoticed in the study of animal behavior in 
comparative psychology, and is frequently ignored in ethology too. Reasons for this may 
include the traditional focus on the functions of behavior in its species-specific form in 
adult animals, a preformationist or deterministic conception of development, and 
generally the separation of psychology from biology. In psychology the process of 
learning is set against the maturational unfolding of the young to the adult instead of 
being understood as one part of the wide range of processes by which an organism 
Stotz/Allen: From receptors to learning, 8/27/09 3 
integrates environmental information, all of which are part and parcel of behavioral 
development.  
 
Studies by developmental psychobiologists and some social neuroscientists, to be 
described further below, show that the generalizations of the previous paragraph are not 
universally true (Michel and Moore 1995; Cacioppo and Berntson 2004). While some 
focus on naturally occurring individual differences, others study the necessity of 
individual experience in explaining a species-typical outcome. Social neuroscience is a 
relatively new research field that examines the role of the central nervous system in the 
development and maintenance of social behaviors. Meaney and colleagues have studied 
how individual differences in maternal care in rats can alter an offspring's neural 
development, as well as its ability to cope with stress later in life. The team elucidates the 
molecular mechanisms that modify the expression of genes regulating hippocampal 
synaptic development as well as behavioral and neuroendocrine responses to stress.  
(Meaney 2001). Aside from these promising research areas, the failure to pay sufficient 
attention to developmental questions in the origin of behavior is widespread. Here we 
provide a few prominent examples of this failure from comparative psychology, 
particularly accounts of the relationship between humans and their closest relative.  
 
In a recent paper Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli urge that discontinuities between humans 
and apes are more significant than is typically admitted by primatologists whom they 
accuse of especially ignoring the higher-order, systematic, relational capabilities of 
human users of physical symbol systems (Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli 2008). However, 
just as with most of traditional cognitive science, they confound cultural symbolic 
achievements with individual cognitive competencies.  Their argument for a large 
discontinuity between human and non-human primates rests on a hybrid symbolic-
connectionist model of cognition which does not provide any explicit role for learning, 
and only a diminished role for development, as is commonly the case with models 
already couched in “the currency of symbol manipulation” (McGonigle and Chalmers 
2001).  Such an approach, polemically dubbed the ‘Rational Bubble’ stance, belongs to a 
class of models that have in recent years come under increasing criticism from those 
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taking an embodied stance as a quite unrealistic model of cognitive growth (McGonigle 
and Chalmers 2008).  
 
The difficulty of being fully sensitized to the developmental dimension of cognition is 
highlighted by another example. Tomasello and collaborators have proposed the ‘Cultural 
Intelligence Hypothesis’ (CIH) about the particular role that ‘ultra-social’ learning 
through cultural participation, instruction, and formal schooling played in the 
development and evolution of human cognition (Herrmann et al. 2007; see also 
Tomasello 1999). The CIH gains support from an empirical study that compared the 
capacities of children with apes. But although the CIH is in large part a developmental 
hypothesis, the investigators neglected to address this developmental dimension in their 
experimental design. The apes used in this study, though compared with human children 
of all the same age of 2 ½ years old, were of a wide range of adult ages. Further, no 
information is provided on the rearing conditions, hence enculturated status, of the apes. 
This is quite surprising from a laboratory that has also put forward the ‘Enculturation 
Hypothesis’, an epigenetic model of the effect of human rearing on the cognitive 
development of apes. Research reports supporting this hypothesis, and later reports that 
led the investigators to believe that even ‘normal’ apes are socially more competent than 
originally thought, stand in stark contrast to the findings that support the CIH (Call and 
Tomasello 1998; see Tomasello and Call 2004 for further references).  
 
These examples raise three worries: 1. Many skills that are tested in stand-alone 
experiments have developmental dimensions that most test designs miss or deliberately 
ignore. 2. There may be a range of tasks that younger ages generally perform better than 
adults. 3. One needs the comparative context of the test results in order to interpret them 
properly, so for instance testing untrained and unenculturated apes against enculturated 
apes on the one hands and humans on the other, and sampling all three groups at different 
but developmentally comparable ages, would be necessary. An experiment testing three 
pairs of mother and offspring chimpanzees against university students in a memory task 
provides a case in point (Inouea and Matsuzawa 2007). The young chimps far 
outcompeted human adults, but also their mothers. This result suggests a developmental 
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component within the tested memory faculty rather than a species difference. In order to 
test this, a superior experimental design would have included human children in the 
study. It is important, however, to recognize that different aspects of development may 
proceed at different rates in different species (e.g. Gácsi et al. Forthcoming), thus it is not 
ever possible to perfectly match developmental ages between two species. 
 
Much of comparative psychology takes place against an assumed background of animal 
learning theory, which treats associative learning mechanisms as strongly conserved 
across vertebrate species.  On this conception, the capacity for learning is merely a 
product of development, rather than a process within development. Our main aim in this 
paper is to forge a closer relationship between the concepts of learning, experience, and 
development, and to investigate whether and how both concepts can be usefully deployed 
in the study of (human and non-human) animal behavior. This will require a biologically 
informed comparative psychology, and the formulation of a concept of ‘experience’ that 
includes all aspects of environmental stimuli that lead to long-term, adaptive changes of 
behavior, including ‘learning’ in its original sense. In other words, our use of the concept 
experience is not limited to sensory processing but includes a quite heterogeneous mix of 
environmental resources influencing the system’s behavior. 
 
This understanding follows Schneirla’s original definition of experience, emphasized by 
his student Daniel Lehrman: “the contribution to development of the effects of 
stimulation from all available sources (external and internal), including their functional 
trace effects surviving from earlier development (Schneirla 1957, 1966).” Within this 
wide range of processes “learning is only a relatively small part” (Lehrman 1970, 30). To 
take this really on board one needs to acknowledge that physiological regulation and 
behavior cannot be as sharply separated, since their underlying mechanisms do not 
necessarily belong to distinctly different classes, even more so in early development. 
Introducing the concept of experience is not another way of saying that all behavior is 
learned, but a vehicle to bring home the inadequacy of the distinction between innate and 
acquired. 
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In section 2 we will identify and criticize two received views of development, 
predeterminism and the so-called Modern Consensus. In their place we propose an 
‘epigenetic systems view of development’ encompassing the organism in its 
developmental niche, which takes seriously the idea that all traits, even those conceived 
of as ‘innate’, have to develop out of a single-cell state through the interaction between 
genetic and non-genetic (experiential) resources of development. The message of this 
section will not only be that one should dispense with old dichotomies when attempting 
to explain the development of a phenotypic trait, physiological and behavioral. We go 
further to claim that the different dichotomies, such as innate-acquired or nature-nurture, 
are not only inappropriate labels in themselves, mere placeholders for a real causal 
analyses of development; they also do not, as is commonly held, map neatly onto each 
other: genes do not equal nature, nor does environment stand for nurture. As a matter of 
fact, no developmental factor corresponds to either nature or nurture. Instead we want to 
promote an understanding of nature that shifts attention from allegedly fixed genetic 
causes to the range of natural phenotypic outcomes, and a conception of nurture as the 
normal developmental processes leading to those outcomes.  
 
Section 3 will look at several conceptions of learning and cognition in psychology and 
how they are employed in the study of a wide range of organisms. We place an emphasis 
on simple systems approaches, such as invertebrates, the spinal cord, single cell 
organisms, and even eukaryotic cells in a multicellular organism, in which the boundary 
between learning and other kinds of experience becomes fluid. This is an important step 
toward reconciling accounts of learning with our conception of epigenetic development 
that necessarily includes some form of experience in the construction of any 
physiological or behavioral trait. 
 
Section 4 will attempt a synthesis of the two concepts. We lay out how, in a systems view 
of development, learning may appear as just one among many processes in which the 
experience of an environmental input generates an appropriate response and hence 
influences the behavioral phenotype. This will be followed by a discussion of the concept 
of ontogenetic niche and the kinds of experience it affords. We also discuss how such a 
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new synthesis should help to overcome the age-old dualism between innate and acquired 
and thereby opens up the possibility of developing scientifically more fruitful 
distinctions. Finally, section 5 summarizes the argument of the paper and draws some 
conclusions for philosophy. 
 
2. Taking Development seriously 
Scientific understanding of the nature and history of living things, including their 
cognitive capacities and behavioral phenotype, depends crucially on having a proper 
understanding of the most basic of biological processes that brought them about: 
development. Since ancient times this process has captured the imagination of scholars 
but has eluded a satisfactory explanation or consistent framework until today. The main 
problem in the interpretation of development has from the beginning been the question of 
whether organisms merely unfold or mature out of something already formed from the 
beginning, or whether they emerge as something qualitatively novel from an 
undifferentiated and unformed state. Despite being declared dead many times, this debate 
is alive and well today in the dichotomy of nature, or genetic determinism, and nurture, or 
environmental plasticity. 
 
Preformationism, epigenesis, and the Modern Consensus 
Preformationism, one of the ancient conceptions of development that goes back to 
Hippocrates, held that the organism is formed from the beginning, with the 
developmental process bringing about no qualitative change but merely unfolding. Some 
preformationists considered gametes as minuscule organisms, tiny homunculi they 
actually claimed to make out under the microscope, needing just to grow or unfold 
themselves. In the 19th century, preformationism was replaced by predeterminism, the 
idea that development consists of an orderly progression of qualitative change to a 
predetermined endpoint. According to the preformationist, environmental factors are 
understood as a mere background of supportive and permissive factors. In this view, 
behavior appears as an ‘epiphenomenon of neural maturation’ (Gottlieb 2001).  
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The main rival to the preformationist and predeterminist conceptions was the idea of 
epigenesis that dates back to Aristotle and maintained that development is a contingent 
process of differentiation out of a homogeneous and undifferentiated state with no 
predetermined endpoint. Without an easy preformationist interpretation for the seemingly 
orderly progression of developmental events, however, epigenesists needed to appeal to 
either internal or external teleological or vital forces. Due to the mechanistic spirit of 
embryology in the late 19th century vitalism, and therefore epigenesis, has fallen in deep 
disregard (Robert 2004; Maienschein 2005). However, one should understand both 
positions as necessarily ill-informed attempts at a materialist and scientific explanation of 
development. The preformationists’ desire to conceive of organisms fully as the result of 
known physical forces required the ‘auxiliary’ assumption that cells within the organism 
existed in a preformed and god-given state. Epigenesists conceived of development 
without this deistic assumption, and hence needed to propose an unknown (but not 
necessarily mystical) vitalist force acting on biological objects, comparable to Newton’s 
forces that applied to physical objects. Arguably, the early 20th century with its 
transmission genetics vindicated the former position, while the dawn of postgenomic 
biology and the science of self-organization and complexity brought the new 
preformationism into disrepute and vindicated the epigenetic position. 
 
The Century of the gene (Keller 2000) brought about a new and more sophisticated 
preformationism, which replaced ‘preformation’ with ‘information’ encoded in the 
genome needed to make an organism. True to the spirit of today’s interactionism the 
mainstream modern consensus can be “standardly construed as the epigenesis of 
something preformed in the DNA” (Robert 2004, 34). Instead of avoiding the unscientific 
dangers of both preformation and vitalist epigenesis, however, it rests ultimately on an 
unscientific conception of gene and gene action. In our view, the ‘genetic program’ with 
its evasion of the responsibility to give a causal-mechanistic explanation of the problem 
of development is tantamount to a materialized vital force. Hence the new conception of 
genes that ‘program’ outcomes is in this sense equivalent to an ‘animistic’ 
predeterminism. 
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In its place we want to promote what others have called ‘probabilistic, contingent, or 
constitutive epigenesis’, a systems view that understands development as an epigenetic 
process of qualitative change based on the orderly emergence of novel behavioral traits 
during development without recourse to a preexisting plan. The contingent nature of 
development, due to the immense importance of experiential factors at all stages of 
development, from the regulation of gene expression to the learning of tool use or 
language, demands that we take it seriously (Gottlieb 2001; Michel and Moore 1995; 
Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray 2001; Robert 2004). 
 
Beyond Nature and Nurture 
One of the foremost aims of a new conception of development is to challenge the widely 
held view that the physiological or behavioral phenotype derives from either nature or 
nurture, or from both nature and nature. Both the exclusive and the additive models make 
no biological sense whatsoever, since no genetic factor can properly be studied 
independent of, or just in addition to, the environment. The same is true for the 
environment, which in itself is a concept that includes a wide variety of very different 
causes and factors, from the genomic environment of a gene, over its chromatin 
packaging and cellular context, up to ecological, social and cultural influences on the 
whole organism. So-called innate traits may also be effects of epigenetic factors which 
are reliably reproduced with the help of ontogenetic niche construction. To resolve the 
nature-nurture debate a new view of development is needed to address several distinct but 
related sub-problems: 1) It needs to systematically question preconceptions of 
‘explanatory’ categories of behavior, such as innate, acquired, genetically determined or 
programmed, which obscure the necessity of investigating developmental processes in 
order to gain insight into the actual mechanisms of behavior. In addition such 
preconceptions are prone to committing the ‘phylogenetic fallacy’, which conflates 
evolutionary and developmental explanations. 2) Such a new account needs to promote a 
new understanding of the nature of inheritance, which includes maternal effects on gene 
expression, epigenetic factors such as genetic imprinting, behavioral, cultural and 
symbolic inheritance systems, and ontogenetic niche construction. 3) A realistic view of 
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gene action and activation is of pivotal importance to a theory of development since it 
helps to distinguish between explanations of the role of genes in development on the one 
hand and of the complete process of development on the other. 4) A new epigenetic 
understanding of development should ultimately resolve the dichotomy between 
preformationism and epigenesis, and between ‘maturation’ and ‘learning’. These four 
aims are preconditions for the integration of the concepts of ‘development’ and ‘learning’ 
in biological and psychological research into behavior and cognition. 
Explanatory categories of behavior 
The main problem with allegedly explanatory categories of behavior such as instinctive 
or learned, is that they effectively suspend further investigations into the real ontogenetic 
causes of a behavior. They do this by their very nature of purporting to explain while 
actually merely labeling the phenomenon. After careful and often arduous empirical 
investigation, all apparently ‘innate’ processes operating to regulate behavior have turned 
out to involve epigenetic or experiential factors (Blumberg 2005). As Griffiths has 
argued, the vernacular concept of innateness can imply three different and unrelated 
things, namely the developmental fixity (non-involvement of experience), species-
typicality, or adaptedness of a trait (Griffiths 2002). All of them are standardly equated 
with an underlying genetic determination.  
 
Besides wanting to argue against the existence of any genetically determined trait, we 
maintain that a deeper investigation of all three characteristics is able to show their 
relative independence of each other. Evolutionary adaptations need not be 
developmentally fixed, independent of life experience, and hard to change, but can 
instead be phenotypically plastic, as is the case with many highly environmentally 
sensitive polyphenisms, distinct phenotypes that are elicited by different environmental 
conditions (see below section 4). Nor do adaptations need to be species-typical or 
universal.  They can result from frequency-dependent selection, where the trait is only 
adaptive if a certain percentage of the population carries it. Species-typical or universal 
traits are not necessarily the result of natural selection but can be dictated by strong 
physical or developmental constraints that render them hard or even impossible to 
Stotz/Allen: From receptors to learning, 8/27/09 11 
change. This has been shown by many examples uncovered by the new 
‘physicoevolutionary’ approach, or by research into the homologies of organisms 
(Newman 2003; Gilbert 2003). Last but not least, universality need not be and often is 
not due to the developmental fixity or experience-independence of a trait. It may be and 
often is due to the reliable availability of certain experiences to which the organism must 
be exposed to develop a trait. Song learning in many bird species is a case in point. In 
some species of birds, such as the Brown-headed Cowbird, all birds belonging to a 
population sing the same song (while in many others the songs of individuals may differ 
substantially, such as in the Australian Lyre bird, or the Indian Common Mynah). While 
instances of uniform songs were once taken as support for the genetic determination of 
song ‘learning’, we now know that cowbirds have to be exposed to other members of 
their species in order to acquire their population-specific song. The story in cowbirds, 
which are nest parasites and are therefore not raised by their own parents or even a 
member of their own species, is even more complicated and intriguing than with birds 
which acquire the song from their parents.  The details of how they acquire their song 
need not be described here – it suffices to say that cowbirds nevertheless always learn to 
sing the particular dialect of the population they belong to because of the reliability with 
which they meet, recognize and flock with members of their own species and are 
therefore exposed to the right stimulating experiences during development (West, King, 
and Duff 1990; Freeberg et al. 2002). 
 
Transgenerational stability need not rely on the faithful transmission of DNA. Natural 
selection selects for adaptive traits or phenotypes; that is, it selects for outcomes and not 
for developmental mechanisms. Outcomes always derive from non-linear interactions 
among a range of diverse developmental resources. Their organization frequently exhibits 
phenotypic plasticity, a capacity that allows the organism to react adaptively to different 
environmental conditions (Pigliucci 2001; West-Eberhard 2003; Gilbert and Epel 2009). 
The stable inheritance of this adaptive phenotype depends on the reliable transmission of 
all the necessary developmental factors across generations. In other words, phenotypic 
plasticity relies on a dependable yet flexible ‘developmental niche’ which is faithfully 
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reconstructed by the species, the parent and the organism itself (West and King 1987). 
The subject of selection is the whole developmental system. 
 
Extragenetic inheritance and developmental niche construction 
The construction of the developmental niche relies heavily on the extragenetic 
inheritance of developmental resources. This heterogeneous process includes maternal 
and paternal effects, which cannot be reduced to just the influence of parental genes or 
RNAs on their offspring, but includes all processes of care for the offspring. These are 
comprised of imprinting systems, cellular structures, gut organisms, differential 
provisioning of resources, preference induction (oviposition, imprinting on food, habitat, 
and mates), and social learning, to name just a few (Jablonka and Lamb 2005; Mousseau 
and Fox 1998; Maestripieri and Mateo 2009). Ontogenetic niche construction is one way 
to conceptualize 'extended inheritance'. Inheritance systems have evolved to allow for the 
transmission of crucial information from parents to offspring. A principled definition of 
inheritance must include whatever is reliably present in each generation due to the 
parental generation and necessary to reconstruct the life cycle. We should not single out a 
particular type of resource as the source of intergenerational stability. A reliably 
reproduced developmental system is the result of the reliable provision of a wide range of 
developmental resources necessary to reconstruct the organism’s life cycle, of which 
DNA is just one element. Organisms place DNA into a developmental setting that is 
always highly characteristic of a lineage and commonly owes much of its structure to the 
activity of previous generations. Evolution has come up with a wide range of strategies to 
construct the ontogenetic niche to dependably guide the developmental process.  
 
What all the above cases of inheritance through environment construction have in 
common is that they make the transmission of crucial information more reliable. Parental 
activity can facilitate, guide and entrench social learning. While some of the 
aforementioned mechanisms have at first sight not much in common with the 
construction of cognitive or epistemic structures, in the latter cases of behavioral, 
ecological and cultural inheritance the biological shades smoothly into the cognitive.  For 
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example, the emergence of cognitive capacities for tracking objects that are out of sight 
depends on the development of motor systems regulating embodied actions such as 
reaching (Smith and Breazeal 2007 show how cognition emerges out of non-cognitive 
processes). 
 
West and King were among the first to “Ask not what’s inside the genes you inherited, 
but what your genes are inside of” (West and King 1987, 552). A look at the enormous 
complexity of gene expression of eukaryotes reveals a very flexible and reactive genome 
open to many intra-and extra-organismal environmental influences which makes it 
necessary for organisms to manage aspects of their own ontogenetic environment. It is 
not which genes you have that has phenotypic consequences, but how they are expressed 
by the higher order network of gene regulation that controls the time- and tissue 
dependent expression of genes. There have been repeated attempts to reduce epigenetic 
mechanisms to the action of inherited or parent-of-origin genes, so that ultimately the real 
causes are all genetic. This special pleading fails in the light of the discovery that the 
regulated expression of genes ultimately depends on a host of environmental factors. 
 
Environmental regulation of gene expression 
Genetic activity is involved in all biological processes, but so are non-genetic factors. 
Explanations listing only interacting genes are biased at best and relatively vacuous at 
worst. More informative explanations give an account of why and how certain genes are 
expressed at a particular place and time, an account that necessarily includes a range of 
very specific additional factors, including environmental signals. 
 
Postgenomic biology has brought with it a new conception from the active gene to the 
reactive genome that is activated and regulated by cellular processes that include signals 
from the internal and external environment (Stotz 2006). This is not the place to report 
the details now available on the mind-numbing complexities of the expression of genes 
during development, instead a few central ideas should suffice. The last decade of 
genome-sequencing has revealed the paradox that the complexity of organism is not 
related to its number of genes. Instead, it seems to be related to the complexity of the 
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expression of a limited number of coding sequences. In the last two decades development 
has become equated with differential gene expression, but what is often forgotten in this 
definition is the complex network of other molecules (such as proteins and metabolites), 
cellular structures, 3-dimensional cellular assemblages and other higher-level structures 
that control or are otherwise involved not only in this differential expression of genes but 
in a wide range of other developmental processes decoupled from the direct influence of 
DNA sequences. 
 
These mechanisms do not just control when genes are switched on and off, but also 
which parts of the DNA sequence will be transcribed, spliced and edited in complicated 
ways, and translated at specific rates. Often the particular mixture of gene products and 
their interacting cellular signaling factors are referred to as the cellular code. The 
cytoplasmic chemical gradients, plus the maternal gene products, inherited with the 
mother’s egg, give this process a head start, but the mother’s control over her progenies’ 
genes and their environment does not stop there. Chemical processes in the womb, and 
after birth, rearing practices such as the differential licking of pups by rat mothers, 
continue to influence (neurological) development through gene expression levels (Moore 
1984; Meaney 2001). Parental chemical modification of the DNA influences the 
expression of genes throughout the offspring’s life. This imprinting system is often called 
the histone, chromatin or epigenetic code. 
 
Genes have an important role in development, but their role can be properly understood 
only within the larger system that holds controlling influence over them. Jason Scott 
Robert summarizes this attitude thus: 
To take development seriously is to take development as our primary explanandum, 
to resist the substitution of genetic metaphors for developmental mechanisms … The 
translation of embryology’s hard problem (how a specific organism arises from a 
single, relatively homogenous cell) into a problem about gene action and activation 
generates explanations at the level of genes; but these explanations solve (or, rather, 
begin to solve) the subsidiary problem of the role of genes in development, not the 
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problem of development as such. … There is indeed good reason to believe that 
genetics reduces to development, and not the other way around. (Robert 2004, 22) 
 
A new epigenesis 
What a new account of development really has to accomplish is not just to go beyond 
these vexed dichotomies such as innate and learned, but to provide a framework that 
integrates a complex set of heterogeneous factors into a system of developmental 
resources all of which are reliably reproduced in succeeding generations of a 
developmental system but none of which really belong alone to either ‘gene’, ‘organism’ 
or ‘environment’ (the famous “Triple Helix” of Richard Lewontin 2000). Its 
contextualization of genes should obviate “even naïve temptations toward 
gene/environment dichotomies, and … will open up a very rich area of empirical 
investigations to examination and conceptualization in developmental-system terms. … 
Ultimately, such a view should work towards “overcoming inner/outer dichotomies in 
favor of self-organizing, causally reciprocal systems of interaction” (Moss 2001, 85). 
Developmental Systems Theory (DST), an alternative approach to integrating evolution, 
development and inheritance, provides just such a framework and its conception of 
development is basically the one promoted in this paper (for a short introduction in its 
central tenets see Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray 2001).  
 
The important systems features of such a view are the rejection of dichotomous 
description of behavior in favor of a full analysis in terms of continuing interaction 
between, and the joint determination by, heterogeneous developmental resources. 
Learning may be involved but only as part of an overall concept of experience which 
include less obvious contributions, such as self-stimulation. An important part of such an 
analysis implies seeing behavior as belonging to the organism’s overall anatomical and 
physiological make-up. A dynamical systems view of locomotor development 
exemplifies such an approach very well by including the growth of muscles and the 
infant’s strength in an account of behavioral coordination of movement (e.g., Thelen 
1995; Spencer et al. 2006). Other important features of a developmental systems account 
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are the context sensitivity and developmental contingency of all developmental factors; 
the distributed control of development upon its heterogeneous resources, and the 
acknowledgement of the role played by the developmental system to control its further 
development; extending the idea of inheritance to include other factors than DNA, 
including factors formerly thought of as ‘environmental’ or ‘experiential’ if they are 
reliably reproduced or ‘passed on’ to succeeding generations; and last but not least the 
reconceptualization of development (and evolution) as the interactive construction in a 
thoroughly epigenetic account of development that “never sidesteps the task of 
explaining how a developmental outcome is produced” (Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray 
2001, 4). This broad conception of ‘epigenetics’ is expressed succinctly by Eva Jablonka: 
 
Epigenetics … focuses on the general organizational principles of developmental 
systems, on the phenotypic accommodation processes underlying plasticity and 
canalization, on differentiation and cellular heredity, on learning and memory 
mechanisms. Epigenetics includes the study of the transmission of subsequent 
generations of developmentally-derived differences between individuals, thereby 
acknowledging the developmental aspect of heredity. (Jablonka, pers. comm., 
cited in Gottlieb 2001) 
 
Reclaiming the Environment 
Such an epigenetic view of development necessitates a new appreciation of the 
environment, which has been conspicuously absent from the last 100 years of 
developmental research. The rise of the new science of Entwicklungsmechanik 
(developmental mechanics) in the late 19th and beginning of the 20th century saw the 
demise of the anatomical tradition, which due to its evolutionary framework and its 
methods of observation of developing organisms in their natural context came to be 
regarded as old-fashioned and unscientific, and mystical ideas of epigenesis were 
completely rejected. The new mantra of experimentation – with its new methodology of 
manipulating the animal in controlled laboratory settings – brought the discipline of 
embryology, now called developmental biology, from the sea shore to the indoors. It is 
necessary to understand the emerging ‘model organism’ approach against this 
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background. To make the scientist independent from the dictates of seasonal availability 
and natural variability, laboratories started to breed their own animals, with the goal of 
making them constantly available and as uniform as possible. This constrained the choice 
of organism, which “must be selected for the inability of their development to be 
influenced by specific environmental cues”. In other words, “the influence of … 
environmental sources of phenotypic diversity were progressively eliminated under the 
physiological context of embryology” (Gilbert 2003, 88f).  
 
While the physiological tradition favored the whole organism at the expense of the 
environment, a newly emerging genetics focused on genes at the expense of the 
organism. Both research traditions discounted and dispensed with the environment, the 
former the external habitat of the organism and the latter the internal cellular environment 
of genes and their expression. This shows a parallelism with the contemporaneous and 
ironically named ‘environmental determinism’ movement in behavioristic psychology, 
which, by moving the study of animal behavior and learning into the laboratory, 
dispensed with both the variety of organisms and their natural habitat in favor of uniform 
organisms and controlled (‘environmental’) test conditions.  
 
We contend that ecological validity will be an indispensable factor for studying 
development, experience and learning. New approaches that call for the investigation of 
organisms ‘in the real world’, such as Ecological Developmental Biology (Gilbert 2001; 
Gilbert and Epel 2009) and Developmental Ecology (West 2003), have inspired a flood of 
new observations and experiments cementing the influential role of ecology in the study 
of behavior. 
 
3. Experience and Learning: from subtle influences to obvious 
connections  
 
This section looks at the history and current accounts of research into mechanisms of 
learning in animals, with an emphasis on simple systems approaches in which the 
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boundary between learning and other kinds of experience becomes fluid. This is an 
important step toward reconciling accounts of learning with our conception of epigenetic 
development that necessarily includes some form of experience in the construction of any 
physiological or behavioral trait. 
 
Naked behavior: the loss of internal cognition and the natural environment 
In the 19th century, studies of complex behaviors typically contrasted innate, instinctual 
behavior with the products of learning and intelligence.  But even some pre-Darwinian 
writers such as Henry Lewis Morgan argued that explanations in terms of instinct were 
vacuous because they merely attributed to an unknown material cause what would 
otherwise be regarded as the product of intelligence (Johnston 2002).  Nevertheless, the 
distinction persisted, and by the late 19th century the concepts of instinct and intelligence 
were both understood within the general framework of evolutionary biology.  Both 
notions remained controversial even within that framework.  Comparative psychologists, 
exemplified by Conway Lloyd Morgan, struggled with the question of how to deal with 
the subjective aspects of intelligence in a rigorous experimental fashion. At the same 
time, earlier experimental work on instinctive behavior was called into question.  For 
instance, T. Mann Jones and Lloyd Morgan both repeated Douglas Spalding's 
experiments on feeding behaviors in chicks and found that, contrary to Spalding's 
conclusion, they involved a learned component (Boakes 1984). 
 
Among the people influenced by Lloyd Morgan was Edward L. Thorndike who, at the 
beginning of the 20th century, demonstrated just how empirically tractable animal 
learning could be.  Thorndike's experiments with animals escaping “puzzle boxes” 
showed how to quantify learning in terms of the decrease in time to escape with 
experience (Thorndike 1911).  But Thorndike's methods also initiated a new trend in 
comparative psychology towards using laboratory setups that had little connection to 
evolutionary biology.  Thorndike tested a range of different species and emphasized the 
comparative aspects of psychology, but his use of artificial situations and his formulation 
of general laws of learning such as his famous Law of Effect suggested that species 
differences were secondary.  
Stotz/Allen: From receptors to learning, 8/27/09 19 
 
Consequently, with the rise of behaviorism, there came a biologically uninformed 
environmentalism that regarded the main differences between species as the range of 
stimuli and reinforcers that could support classical Pavlovian stimulus-stimulus (S-S) 
conditioning and instrumental response-outcome (R-O) conditioning. Rats, pigeons, but 
few other species, were intensively studied, because it was assumed that, for the purposes 
of general learning theory, species differences were relatively unimportant.  The 
behaviorists' categories of S-S and R-O conditioning, and their interpretations of animal 
behavior, were inseparably linked to, and ultimately defined by, their experimental 
methods. The terms ‘associative’ and ‘nonassociative’ learning are both theoretical 
abstractions. They are not the result of direct observation; their occurrences are merely 
inferred. Also, the distinction between single event and related event learning can be seen 
as rather arbitrary, because it classifies types of learning according to a formal outcome 
(in a laboratory experiment, no less) rather than considering the underlying mechanisms, 
which might be quite similar at the neural or molecular levels (Grau and Joynes 2005). 
This operationalist approach to learning involved little or no regard for the animal’s 
evolutionary or developmental history, its ecological habitat, and its cognitive processes. 
Or, at least, no explicit regard.  For, as William Timberlake has argued, behaviorists’ 
experimental apparatuses were ‘tuned’ to evolutionary, developmental, and ecological 
aspects of the organisms studied (Timberlake 2002).  Rat learning, but not pigeon 
learning, was investigated in mazes, and the use of different operant responses, whether 
pecking or bar pressing, and even subtler aspects of equipment design, such as the size 
and positioning of levers in a Skinner box, implicitly reflect the experimenters' adaptation 
of laboratory setups to biological features of the organisms under study. 
 
Comparative psychologists have been paying explicit attention to ecological aspects of 
learning for well over a decade now (see, e.g., an early review by Shettleworth 1994). 
The last decade has seen much exciting work on varieties of social and observational 
learning, and even ‘insight’ learning, which do not fit the standard models for classical 
and instrumental conditioning.  Nevertheless, the lively debate about these topics has 
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been conducted largely in terms of operational definitions and experimental protocols, 
rather than underlying mechanisms.  
 
Questions about which species are capable of which forms of learning are typically 
treated as if organisms come to the task as fully-formed representatives of their species.  
Thus questions about, for example, the imitative capacities of primates rarely take 
individual development into account (Jones 2005).  In fact, it is widely believed on the 
basis of non-developmental studies that monkeys aren’t capable of genuine imitation or 
are very poor at it while apes are naturally more capable (Byrne 2004). But the 
importance of development is underscored by experimental findings with human-reared 
or enculturated apes (mother-raised in captivity with human interaction; nursery-raised; 
laboratory-trained; and raised within human culture) which gave rise to the strong 
“enculturation hypothesis” or the weaker “socialization hypothesis” (Call and Tomasello 
1996; Tomasello and Call 2004; see also Bering 2004; Furlong, Boose, and Boysen 
2008). These explanations provide an epigenetic model of the differential effects of 
enculturation in human socio-cultural environments on the development of a whole range 
of capacities in great apes. Among those are many which nativist theories assign to 
humans alone, such as mental representational capacities and a whole range of social 
cognitive capacities like intentional understanding, empathy, and ‘true imitation’. A 
recent report describing imitation by Japanese macaques points in the direction of a 
similar conclusion about the importance of the social context for development of 
imitative abilities. These macaques were raised in an environment where joint attention 
with human caregivers was emphasized through the use of gestures such as pointing and 
the communicative use of eye-gaze, and they subsequently performed well in imitation 
tasks that macaques typically fail (Kumashiro et al. 2003).  Likewise, Savage-
Rumbaugh's investigation of the bonobo Kanzi for such capacities as language 
comprehension, symbolic communication, and tool use especially when Kanzi is 
contrasted with unenculturated bonobos in the lab such as P-Suke points to the need for 
systematic studies of development (but see Savage-Rumbaugh, Fields, and Spircu 2004 
for a step in this direction).  Lloyd (2004) argues convincingly that many of Savage-
Rumbaugh's critics have seriously underestimated the importance of development. It is, 
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for example beside the point to argue that symbolic communication is outside the 
repertoire of mature, natural-born bonobos.  As she puts it, “in order to draw conclusions 
about potentialities, we must investigate them” (Lloyd 2004, 587). McGonigle & 
Chalmers have also criticized psychologists for underestimating the role of learning in 
cognitive development because their “investigations are rarely followed through from one 
learning episode to another to assess the cumulative benefits (if any) as a function of the 
agent's task and life history” (McGonigle and Chalmers 2001). 
 
Simple learning systems 
Neuroscientists and molecular geneticists interested in animal learning have generally 
adopted the behaviorists' classificatory scheme of S-S (classical Pavlovian) and R-0 
(Skinnerian operant) conditioning, but have also attended to ‘simpler’ forms of single-
stimulus learning, such as habituation, dishabituation, and sensitization.  Invertebrate 
organisms, especially leeches and sea slugs, have provided much of our basic 
understanding of the role of mechanisms of synaptic change in single-stimulus and 
associative learning (Castellucci et al. 1970; Burrell and Sahley 2001). In most such 
work, the basic classificatory scheme is methodological and not tied to individual life 
histories in any detailed way (but see Stopher et al. 1991 for a developmental approach to 
learning in Aplysia; see section 4 for more details).   
 
Some behavioral neuroscientists have recognized the shortcomings of the operationalism 
underlying the traditional classification scheme.  For instance, Grau & Joynes argue for a 
‘neurofunctionalist’ approach which seeks to classify learning in terms of both neural 
mechanisms and adaptive function (Grau and Joynes 2005, 2005).  The work done in 
Grau's lab has shown remarkable learning and plasticity in the rat spinal cord, detached 
from the rat brain.  Their results include long-term effects of nociceptive experience on 
spinal learning and on its capacity to recover from spinal injury (reviewed in Grau et al. 
2006; Allen, Grau, and Meagher 2009).  These results suggest that even in the spinal 
cord, ‘experience’ has lasting effects on the capacity of neurons to respond adaptively to 
future environmental conditions.  Even better, spinal cords can ‘learn to learn’ and are 
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susceptible to an analog of  ‘learned helplessness’ in which learning is impaired.  Despite 
the obvious developmental significance of these results, organismic development is not 
an explicit component of their research program.  
 
With hindsight, perhaps no one should have been surprised that the vertebrate spinal cord 
is a plastic, adaptive system in its own right. After all, invertebrates with fewer neurons 
than the typical rat spinal cord nevertheless show various forms of learning.  The basic 
cellular mechanisms for learning and memory are highly conserved between invertebrates 
and vertebrates (Burrell and Sahley 2001) and may even go further back in evolutionary 
history. For example, the NMDA receptors involved in the synaptic plasticity of neurons 
use proteins for binding amino acids that are highly conserved from bacteria (Kuryatov et 
al. 1994).  
 
Even the simplest organisms, bacteria, respond differently to similar configurations of 
cues in their surroundings on the basis of their specific life experiences. Some of the 
physical properties of the cellular boundary and the bacteria’s complement of cell-surface 
and internal receptors can react during early growth to environmental factors such as 
kinds of nutrients, temperature, pH, or concentrations of toxins. Other processes formerly 
thought to be restricted to more complex organisms have now been described as the norm 
rather than the exception of prokaryotic behavior. These include the processes of 
morphogenesis (change in form), cellular differentiation (change in function), aging, 
communication, and a whole range of group-mediated, cooperative behavior, such as 
aggregation and sporulation (Lyon 2006; see also Shapiro 2007; Ben-Barak 2008; 
Zimmer 2008). Shapiro argues that sophisticated information processing capacities in 
prokaryotic cells warrants a more contemporary view of bacteria as cognitive entities 
acting in response to sensory inputs. He describes how smart even the smallest living 
cells can be due to their capacity for meaningful intercellular communication. “Here the 
term cognitive refers to processes of acquiring and organizing sensory inputs so that they 
can serve as guides to successful action. The cognitive approach emphasizes the role of 
information gathering in regulating cellular function” (Shapiro 2007, 812).  
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The concept of bacterial learning may thus be no mere philosophical abstraction. But, 
someone concerned with preserving old distinctions might press us, do bacteria really 
learn? The answer one gives, of course, depends very much on one’s definitions of 
learning and experience. The question gets a negative answer if learning is restricted to 
organisms with nervous systems that connect sensory to motor systems, and sensory 
systems are conservatively defined as specialized organs with specialized receptor cells 
that connect a specialized cognitive system that has specialized information-transmission 
cells to the outside world to extract information from the environment for action (or 
behavior, narrowly defined). However, it possibly gets a positive answer, if 
‘environment’ is understood as the source of a “quite heterogeneous mix of resources 
called experience” (Moore 2003, 350) extracted by a wide variety of means, and if 
knowledge and means for behavior derive from more than what is known to the senses. It 
is definitely ‘yes’ if cell-surface receptors are subsumed under the rubric of sensory 
organs (Baker and Stock 2007). 
 
When scientists extend the application of concepts beyond their usual meanings it is right 
for philosophers and other scientists to be skeptical about whether the extension is 
warranted or helpful. With the application of concepts such as learning (Tagkopoulos, 
Liu, and Tavazoie 2008), memory and anticipation (Saigusa et al. 2008), and cognition 
(Baker and Stock 2007) to single-celled organisms there will, no doubt, be missteps along 
the way. But not all of these extensions can or should be dismissed on the basis of 
definitions provided a priori.  As biologists have become better and better attuned to the 
extensive network of interactions between genome and environment, and have gained a 
greater appreciation of the plasticity of biological systems, the old distinction between 
development and learning looks increasingly untenable.  Almost a century ago, 
Carmichael made an early attempt at such a synthesis. He wrote that “for in all 
maturation there is learning; and in all learning there is hereditary maturation” 
(Carmichael 1925, 260 ; quoted in Johnston 2001). This was ill-conceived because of its 
poor concept of development as maturation, and its still intact dichotomy between innate 
and acquired. We believe that it is now possible to make good on the promise of treating 
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learning as just one process of experience, and all of them under the general umbrella of 
development. 
 
4. Synthesizing development and learning 
There are many ways to reorganize the relationship between two disciplines – here 
biology and psychology - and their concepts or processes – here development and life 
versus learning and cognition. Greater appreciation for the biological underpinnings of 
cognition has led some to propose the equation of life and cognition.  Most notably, the 
‘Santiago’ theory of Maturana and Varela makes this explicit: “Living systems are 
cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition. This statement is 
valid for all organisms, with or without a nervous system” (Maturana and Varela 1980, 
13). All living organisms, even individual cells, react adaptively to individual experience 
of external perturbations to maintain their identity.  According to this view, cognition, 
understood as the very basic operation of making a distinction, defines the boundaries of 
the system and is therefore the activity involved in the self-production (autopoiesis) of 
living systems. In other words, cognition is not equivalent to, but an indispensable 
characteristic of, life. 
 
We certainly don’t want to propose the fusion of biology and psychology to the extent 
that both would lose their distinct identities. Rather we promote a biologically informed 
psychology and a psychologically informed biology. This would require the reciprocal 
reconciliation, integration and synthesis of their overlapping areas of study, such as the 
study of behavior, and of their central concepts, among which are development and 
learning, and as we propose, experience. The study of behavior looks at three 
interconnected time-scales: evolution, development, and situated behavior. This 
integration is based on an essential role for biology in a theory of behavior. Central to the 
project of synthesizing development and learning is to identify cases of epigenetic 
interaction, both narrowly and widely construed, the role of experience and learning in 
development, and the role of development in the phenomenon of learning. From a 
psychobiological perspective, learning appears as a category within an overall framework 
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of development as the lifelong, adaptive construction of the phenotype out of the 
interaction between genes, the organism and its environment. Taking the idea of 
phenotypic plasticity seriously may lead to a conception of development as a lifelong 
process of ‘learning’ or ‘acquiring’ a mode of living in an environment that is partly 
constructed by the organism or the previous generation. The other way around, learning 
understood as the acquisition of novel behavior and gain of knowledge about the 
environment, becomes synonymous with developing.  
 
The role of Epigenetic mechanisms in development and learning 
Traditionally, behavior has been explained by dissociable influences of genes – 
producing hardwired, innate behavior – and environment – causing acquired, learned 
behavior. Today we know that the picture is much more complex and intertwined, and 
that experience, or any kind of environmental inputs in general, achieve their effect on 
behavior at least in part through the regulation of gene expression in all cells, but 
particularly the nervous system. Three general mechanisms are employed. One is signal 
transduction from the environment through the sensory system to the genome, mediated 
by the neuroendocrine system and their associated hormones that function as both 
transcription factors and neuro-transmitters. Secondly, during the process of direct 
induction, environmental factors interact directly with the cell where they can either 
activate or repress signal transduction cascades that active gene expression. Thirdly, 
following environmental induction epigenetic molecular mechanisms alter gene 
expression by chemically modifying the DNA nucleotide bases or the DNA chromatin 
structure. DNA methylation and histone deacylation repress gene expression by blocking 
access to the DNA by transcription factors, while the opposite mechanisms of 
demethylation and acetylation render the DNA active by allowing certain transcription 
factors with promoter binding capacity to recruit the transcriptional machinery to the 
DNA. 
 
Chromatin is the chromosomal complex made up of DNA and histone proteins that 
enables DNA to be tightly packaged into the nucleus and helps to control transcriptional 
access to DNA. Originally thought to be a rather structurally static complex, chromatin 
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has been shown to be part of a very flexible and dynamic mechanism of precise 
transcriptional regulation. Accordingly, chromatin remodeling such as methylation (DNA 
and proteins) and acetylation (protein) does not only occur in early development but can 
happen later in life, thus providing a mechanism through which the environment sculpts 
the genome and affects the phenotype throughout the whole life cycle. Hence the 
response of the ‘epigenome’ to environmental influences is a biological mechanism that 
serves as a medium for the adaptability of the genome to altered environments during 
life. 
 
There are at least four different aspects of how this epigenetic control of gene expression 
relates to development and learning: 1) In the course of morphogenesis and 
psychogenesis undifferentiated and totipotent stem cells divide into pluripotent cells that 
are able to react to environmental signals by remodeling chromatin to change the cell’s 
gene expression; during this process these originally pluripotent cells develop into fully 
differentiated cells identified by their individual ‘epigenetic code’ and its associated 
differential gene-expression pattern. These relatively stable alterations of the chromatin 
structure are one of the cell’s main memory mechanisms by which they inherit and 
maintain their differentiated phenotype.  
 
2) Epigenetic changes are also the main mechanisms underlying the process called ‘fetal 
programming’, “the concept that epigenetic factors in the inauterine environment have a 
profound effect on the trajectory of prenatal development” (Nathanielsz and Thornburg 
2003) that can lead to lasting effects of neonatal experience on adult physical 
(cardiovascular, metabolic diseases) and psychological (stress reaction, neural plasticity, 
depression, schizophrenia) phenotype. There is a wealth of experimental evidence that 
relates maternal care in mammals to epigenetic changes of genes in the cells of selected 
neural systems. For instance, increased NMDA receptor expression can influence 
hippocampal synaptic development and function, which then translates into differential 
spatial learning and memory abilities (Meaney 2001). In other words, there exists a 
developmental need for epigenetic mechanisms to allow formation of a normal nervous 
system. 
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3) Beyond these two developmental aspects, the roles of epigenetic mechanisms in 
cognitive processes throughout life, such as learning and memory formation, are 
becoming increasingly appreciated. These include influences on associative fear 
conditioning, extinction of conditioned fear, latent inhibition, spatial learning and 
memory, and memory recovery. Epigenetic mechanisms have also been implicated in the 
positive effects of environmental enrichment on memory capacity. It can be postulated 
that DNA methylation/histone modification–mediated gene regulation is not only 
important for neural cell differentiation but also crucial for synaptic plasticity and high-
order cognitive functions such as learning and memory, especially the formation of long-
term memories.  
 
Together these studies demonstrate that experience, activity, and neurotransmitter-
dependent activity increases histone acetylation and DNA methylation and that both are 
required for learning and memory. Indeed, there seems to be a dynamic balance between 
inhibition of a memory suppressor gene (protein phosphatase-1) and induction of a 
memory enhancer gene (reelin), antagonistically driven by increased states of DNA 
methylation and histone acetylation, respectively (Miller, Campbell, and Sweatt 2008; 
Noh et al. 2005).  
 
The finding of specific types of memories associated with specific patterns of histone 
modifications suggests the intriguing possibility for a type of epigenetic “code for 
memory formation” (Wood, Hawk, and Abel 2006).  In general, the formation of long-
term memory requires NMDA-receptor-dependent synaptic transmission. However, 
different types of long-term memory seem to be associated with distinctive kinds of 
epigenetically induced modifications of the genetic material: Acetylation of hippocampal 
histone H3 but not H4 is significantly increased in the hippocampus after an animal is 
trained with a contextual fear conditioning paradigm. A different form of long-term 
memory, latent inhibition, was associated with altered acetylation of histone H4, whereas 
H3 acetylation was unaltered by this paradigm (Chwang et al. 2006).  
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4) If an environmentally produced sensory input induces a change in behavior that 
persists beyond the presence of the original stimulus, we are speaking of memory. Such a 
notion of memory applies not just to neural systems, but also to cells that use (among 
other mechanisms) chromatin modifications to maintain changes of gene expression 
through cell divisions for the remainder of a cell’s life. Paradigmatically, learning is 
understood as a usually adaptive, neural response to an input (an external stimulus or the 
organism’s own behavior) in which the input-response relation is memorized. The recall 
of these memorized relations can later be the basis of a more effective response. It has 
recently been suggested that this very general characterization of learning applies not 
only to neuronal systems but also to cellular responses that are based on epigenetic 
mechanisms of cell memory (Ginsburg and Jablonka 2009).  
 
The extensive interplay between epigenetic mechanisms and learning is well enough 
established that it is no longer adequate to ignore it, pleading that it’s too complex to 
consider or outside the scope of traditional learning experiments and theory. 
 
Learning and the provisioning of experience as (part of) development 
 
As we stated at the outset, our objective is to integrate the idea of learning into a wider 
concept of experience.  Specifically, in a systems view of development, learning may 
appear as just one among many processes in which experience influences the phenotype 
in general and behavior in particular.  Experience affects behavior on many time scales.  
Even the most fleeting behavioral effects involve gene regulation and expression, but 
there may be no lasting effects unless the experience is repeated or other conditions 
coincide to shift the system into a new, relatively stable region of its phase space.  Some 
experiences or combinations of experience, however, produce long lasting changes in the 
systems’ dynamics, and when such changes are (typically) adaptive, we may label them 
as either development or learning. 
 
But our use of the phrase ‘development or learning’ is ambiguous.  It could mean that 
these are two fundamentally different kinds of processes that happen to have a similar 
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temporal relationship to experience: relatively long term, typically adaptive effects 
resulting from interactions with contingent aspects of the extracellular environment.  Or, 
it could mean that the development and learning can be more tightly assimilated to one 
another.  Not learning and development, but learning as development.  It is this latter 
interpretation that we wish to defend, if only for the sake of forcing a reconceptualization 
of a crude dichotomy between these terms.  
 
To begin, we start with a relatively uncontroversial description of development as the 
process of organismic transformation from a single cell to a differentiated, structured 
entity.  Because this characterization of development tends to suggest a material or 
anatomical conception of the organ or organism, it can seem like a category mistake to 
force learning into the same mold.  However, it is important to realize that learning is a 
specialized process of (typically neural) differentiation and structural change that 
supports (adaptive) modification of behavior by experience.  From this it follows that 
learning is a kind of developmental process: i.e., learning as development.  As we have 
already indicated in connection with bacterial development, we think that this 
assimilation of learning to development is no mere metaphor: The processes underlying 
bacterial development and neural modification during learning are evolutionarily 
conserved to a surprising degree.   
 
We are also willing to go quite far in the other direction, assimilating development to 
learning. Many if not all biologically significant developmental processes produce lasting 
changes in behavior as a function of experience.  Even something as directly anatomical 
as limb development has behavioral consequences.  Given one standard conception of 
learning as change of behavior as a function of experience, one may conclude that 
development is a kind of learning process.  It might be objected that this conception of 
learning is excessively behavioristic --- better definitions involve acquisition of 
knowledge, or other mental structures.  However, in our view, such ‘knowledge’ is itself 
biologically insignificant unless it results in behavioral change. 
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Several investigators have used the new framework of the developmental niche as one 
way to go beyond both nativist and empiricist oversimplifications of ontogeny and to 
highlight how learning processes are part of species-typical and individual development. 
Jeff Alberts conceptualizes the development of the rat in terms of four consecutive 
ontogenetic niches through which the pup passes on the way to adulthood (Alberts and 
Schank 2006). Common to each niche are channels of sustenance for the developing 
organism, such as nutrients, warmth and insulation, behavioral and social stimuli. The 
ontogeny of species-typical rat behavior is directed by olfactory cues that are provided by 
the different stages of the ontogenetic niche. For example, in the second stage, 
immediately postnatal, olfactory cues on the dam’s nipples guide the pup’s attachment 
and suckling. The pup’s developing sensoria learn to recognize the odor for the nipple 
through chemical cues in the amniotic fluid provided by the prenatal ‘uterine niche’. The 
spread of amniotic fluid after birth over the dam’s body bridges the pre- and post- natal 
niches of the pup.  
 
Another example of how the rat’s developing niche affords the necessary experience for 
the developing pup is the ‘huddle’. Huddling is an important, species-typical behavior of 
the rat exhibited from day 15. Filial huddling preferences are mediated by learned 
olfactory cues. The olfactory-guided species preference is induced by thermotactile 
stimulation provided by the ‘natal niche’. Alberts notes: “Again we find a stereotyped, 
species-typical, developmentally-fixed behavior is learned, with all of the key 
components […] existing as natural features of the ontogenetic niche. … Specific 
features of these [nurturant] niches elicit specific reactions and responses in the 
developing offspring. These reactions and responses constitute conditions sufficient for 
the formation of a learned association and, as a result, the differentiation of behavior. … 
The utter reliability of the ontogenetic niches and the affordances that exist in each are 
inherited as surely as are genes” (Alberts 2008).  
 
Meredith West and Andrew King have shown over many decades of painstaking research 
that a nest parasite, the Brown-headed Cowbird, is not a paradigm example of a 
‘hardwired’ species, as normally assumed. If there is a ‘safety net’ it is not in a ‘genetic 
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program’ but in the social structure of the flock. An individual cowbird’s niche is defined 
by his or her position within the flock, which “gates’ what is “bioavailable” to be 
culturally transmitted or learned throughout the lifespan. According to West and King the 
developmental system is designed to be as open as ecologically possible. To that effect 
evolution has trusted an exogenetic developmental niche to transmit information that is 
vital to cowbird reproduction from one generation to the next (West and King 2008). “It’s 
the dependablility of the niche in delivering certain resources to the young that makes it a 
legacy. They inherit the senses and the surrounding to find what they need. [Therefore] 
ask not what is inherited by genes, but what genes inherit” (West, King, and Arberg 
1988, 46; West and King 1987). One of their important claims is that the ontogenetic 
niche gates what is available to be learned, in other words what really matters is the 
bioavailability of stimulation and experience rather than simple exposure. 
 
Many more examples of the way in which developmental niches provide for the 
reliability of encountering experiences necessary for normal development could be 
provided were there space to do so.  Such examples would include human language 
learning, food and habitat imprinting in insects (oviposition); maternal care and 
stimulation for neural development (sexual behavior and fear reaction in rats; learning 
disposition in chickens). 
 
The development of learning 
There are some quite straightforward reasons why a more developmentally sensitive 
approach to animal learning is useful. It may help to uncover age-related behavior 
differences as well as age-related changes in learning that subjects bring to tasks, and to 
control for, or even exploit, the effects of earlier experiments with the same subjects. 
Further interesting questions concern whether mechanisms and content of learning 
change ontogenetically, and if so, what this can tell us about the generality of learning 
mechanisms in adults. How are experiential regulation of brain development and general 
learning mechanisms related? Do developing and mature brains share the same 
information storage mechanisms or does neural plasticity in early life interfere with the 
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processes of learning and memory (Shair, Barr, and Myron 1991, chapters 1, 6, 14, and 
15)?  
 
A developmental approach to forms of learning and memory in Aplysia helped to 
differentiate a novel inhibitory process that is often masked by sensitization in the adult, 
and two different forms of response facilitation, which emerge at different developmental 
times. Dishabituation and sensitization differ in fundamental ways, such as their 
developmental timetable, their time of onset, and their stimulus requirements. The 
investigators therefore concluded that a formerly held, simple dual-process view is 
inadequate to the features of these two kinds of nonassociative learning processes 
(Stopher et al. 1991). 
 
The quest for new distinctions 
Our deliberate attempt to erase long-held dichotomies and boundaries doesn’t deny the 
existence of distinctions. Drawing useful distinctions is an important part of the scientific 
process of categorization, but sometimes one has to let go of long-held beliefs in order to 
cast new light on an issue, in order to see general principles and continuities instead of 
clear cut distinctions. Understanding development as the contingent process of 
construction as outlined above helps to overcome the unscientific dichotomies of nature 
versus nurture, instinct versus learning or innate versus acquired, and replaces them with 
scientifically more meaningful and fruitful distinctions.  As Lenny Moss puts it: 
What the sad endurance of that tired old dichotomy consisting of (conflated) genes 
and (ill-defined) environment has helped to obscure, are the many levels of biological 
ordering that mediate between individual molecules and whole developmental 
systems. To give up the preformationist umbilical cord is not to drop into an abyss of 
limitless complexity but rather to remain empirically open to discovering what levels 
of biological ordering is most relevant for one’s explanatory purposes (Moss 2001, 
91). 
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Such distinctions need to rest on a deep analysis of the causal roles played by the diverse 
developmental resources within the ontogenetic process. The causal role of ‘genes’, the 
coding sequences in the DNA sequence, is the ‘causal specificity’ of the linear sequence 
of gene products. However, there are cellular processes that change the original coding 
sequences in reaction to the external environment and conditions within the cell, such as 
alternative RNA splicing or RNA editing. Hence the molecules that provide ‘causal 
specificity’ to these sequence-modifying processes share the causal role of genes. 
Another causal role, ‘activator’, is shared by a range of diverse proteins. These same 
proteins may fulfill other causal roles, such as ‘inhibitor’, depending on the context in 
which they find themselves and to which group of interacting molecules they are 
recruited. Activators recruit another large group of diverse proteins that share the causal 
role of ‘transcription factors’, which recruit one of the diverse enzymes polymerase that 
starts DNA transcription. 
 
 An analysis of the causal role of factors reveals a hierarchy of functions, and how many 
factors share a single causal role depends in part on detailed we describe this role 
 
Developmental resources play a range of causal roles. Many cases cited in the ‘eco-devo’ 
literature show that the ‘instructive’ role can be carried out by environmental factors 
while the underlying genes play merely a ‘permissive role, e.g. in cases of polyphenisms. 
Examples include the temperature- or context-dependent sex determination of many 
reptiles, fish and worms. This context-dependency of the morphological and behavioral 
phenotype is a “necessary condition of integrating the developing organism into its 
habitat” (Gilbert 2003, 98). A developmental systems view promotes another distinction: 
between resources that are ‘reliably reproduced’ (therefore inherited) from one generation 
to the next and those that are ‘novel’ or ‘contingent’. Within inherited resources, the 
mechanism of transmission may be ‘sample-based’ or ‘informational’, or may serve the 
role of increasing developmental ‘plasticity’ or ‘canalization’ of phenotype. For any 
causal role at the center of an investigation, there will be a range of factors that are 
‘causally specific’ with respect to it, and others that are mere background conditions. But 
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whatever role is being investigated, hardly ever will it divide developmental resources 
neatly in genetic and non-genetic (Griffiths and Gray 2005).  
 
5. Conclusion 
The last decade has witnessed enormous scientific advances in genomics, systems 
biology, social neuroscience, evolutionary, and ecological and developmental biology, 
introducing notions such as ‘evo-devo’, ‘eco-devo’, phenotypic plasticity, niche 
construction, extragenetic inheritance, developmental systems theory. In light of these 
advances it is no longer reasonable to defend either gene-centered, pre-deterministic 
explanations of behavior or strongly environmentalist explanations. Nature and nurture 
are not separable entities with nature as the a priori plan and nurture as the contingent 
experiences shaping the outcome of the plan’s execution.  Instead, we now know that 
every trait develops out of the nonlinear interactions among a range of very diverse 
developmental resources.  We argue that, for the purpose of explaining the behavioral 
and cognitive capacities of animals, these are not usefully divided into genetic and non-
genetic resources. Behavioral development starts with the environmental regulation of 
gene expression, and depends upon a range of experiences beneath the skin and above the 
gene, to construct the stages of sensory and social learning in vertebrates, to the 
exquisitely sensitive learning capacities of the human brain. ‘Nurture’ is this ongoing 
process of development, while ‘nature’ is the natural outcome of the organism-
environment-system (Oyama 1999). 
 
Our aim in this paper has been to argue that the separation of questions about learning 
and comparative cognition in nonhuman animals from questions about their development 
is as untenable as the old distinction between nature as genes and nurture as environment. 
Too many experiments testing the cognitive abilities of animals are done without fully 
reporting the developmental backgrounds of the research subjects, let alone 
systematically investigating the role of a lifetime of experience in the construction of the 
animals’ behavioral-cognitive phenotype.  
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We have also argued for a more conceptual point about the assimilation of learning and 
development.  That argument can be summarized as follows: 
1. Development is the process encompassing the complete life cycle of organismic 
transformation from a single cell to a differentiated, structured entity. 
2. Learning is a specialized process of (typically neural) differentiation and structural 
change that supports (typically adaptive) modification of behavior by experience 
throughout the lifespan of the organism. 
3. Therefore, learning is a kind of developmental process: i.e., learning as development. 
 
We advance more tentatively an argument for the identification in the opposite direction, 
viz.: 
4.  All developmental processes (that matter biologically) produce a change in behavior 
as a function of experience. 
5. Therefore, development is a kind of learning process. 
 
How might taking development seriously be important to matters of philosophical and 
scientific interest?  In our view, comparative psychology (and the philosophy of animal 
cognition) is seduced by a facile mapping of the cognitive capacities of animals to the 
cognitive stages of humans, as if it is meaningful to say that chimpanzees are the 
cognitive equivalents of two-and-a-half year old children, for example.  Likewise, we 
think that philosophical and scientific energy would be better spent on trying to 
understand the experiences that are important for individuals of various species to 
develop a capacity for learning from experience, rather than trying to argue about the 
extent to which a capacity for imitation is the product of an innate or pre-programmed 
theory of mind module. 
 
Although we do not have the space to develop these points in detail, we also think that 
various philosophical attempts to naturalize intentional content embody preformationist 
assumptions.  The major theories of the past couple of decades treat adult concepts as 
fixed points of meaning.  The assumption was explicit in Jerry Fodor's nativism and it 
appears more subtly in Dretske’s early attempts to ground meaning as the stable outcome 
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of a discrete pre-semantic learning phase (Fodor 1975; Dretske 1981).  While Dretske’s 
account allowed an important role for experience in fixing meanings, it foundered on the 
impossibility of finding a sharp divide between the pre-semantic phase and the adult 
stage of fixed meanings.  The systems view of development treats learning as one among 
many processes in which experience influences behavior in a lifelong process of adaptive 
construction of the phenotype in its environment.  This perspective suggests that the 
existing strategies for naturalizing content are doomed to fail in face of the 
developmental facts.  Any single-factor theory of content will, at best, be a low-
dimensional abstraction of what is a much richer set of interactions between organisms 
and their environments. To some this might suggest an eliminativist stance towards 
notions such as representation, meaning, and intentional content.  Here, however, we do 
not want to take a stand on this issue, although we believe that low-dimensional 
abstractions are sometimes important tools for scientific modeling.  However, more 
inclusive and detailed models are the ultimate goal. 
 
A similar understanding of development to the one proposed here had been arrived at 
independently in one corner of the cognitive science community, specifically among 
those interested in situated and embodied cognition, most notably the branch called 
Dynamical Systems Theory. Samuelson and Smith advocate for the dynamical systems 
perspective when they write, “We believe that in the next century, coupling the dynamics 
of perceiving and remembering with the dynamics of development will lead us to a more 
complete theory of knowledge and its development” (Samuelson and Smith 2000, 98). 
 
Our vision of how to integrate the concepts of learning and development is based on a 
wider understanding of the role of the heterogeneous mix of resources making up 
‘experience’ or ‘environment’ (Moore 2003). To what extent does the experienced 
environment correspond to the environment of behavioral development? If experience is 
defined to involve only what is known through senses, then it is a subset of the latter. A 
wider conception of developmental environments may include non-obvious influences 
with no straightforward connection to their effects on the organism. These influences are 
the object of study in developmental psychobiology but rarely ever investigated by 
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comparative psychologists. With the concept of experience playing a central role, a 
biologically-informed psychology would have as one of its consequences that there 
would be hardly any features whose development is outside the scope of the 
psychological sciences.  It would not, then, be appropriate to take these features as given. 
Calling a feature ‘innate’ or announcing that it ‘matures’ is simply issuing a ”promissory 
note against future developmental psychology and biology” (Griffiths and Stotz 2000, 
38). An elucidation of the developmental cascade by which a behavioral-cognitive 
capacity develops will contain both biological and psychological factors. It is our 
contention that any adequately naturalized account of philosophically significant notions 
such as intentionality, meaning, and knowledge can ill afford to ignore the best going 
scientific account of an organism's nature. 
 
References  
Alberts, J. R., 2008, 'The nature of nurturant niches in ontogeny', Philosophical 
Psychology, 21 (3 (Special Issue, Reconciling Nature and Nurture in the study of 
Cognition and Behavior)):295-303. 
Alberts, J. R., and J. C. Schank, 2006, Constructing ontogenetic niches. In: ALife X 
Conference, Indiana University Bloomington. 
Allen, C., J. W. Grau, and M. W. Meagher, 2009, 'The Lower Bounds of Cognition: What 
Do Spinal Cords Reveal?' In: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and 
Neuroscience, edited by J. Bickle, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baker, M. D., and J. B. Stock, 2007, 'Signal Transduction: Networks and Integrated 
Circuits in Bacterial Cognition', Current Biology, 17 (23):R1021-R1024. 
Ben-Barak, I., 2008, Small Wonders: How Microbes Rule Our World, Carlton North, 
Vic.: Scribe Publication. 
Bering, J. M., 2004, 'A critical review of the "enculturation hypothesis": the effects of 
human rearing on great ape social cognition', Animal Cognition, 7:201-212. 
Blumberg, M., 2005, Basic Instinct: The Genesis of Behavior, New York: Thunder's 
Mouth Press. 
Boakes, R., 1984, From Darwinism to Behaviorism, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Burrell, B. D., and C. L. Sahley, 2001, 'Learning in simple systems', Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology, 11:757–764. 
Byrne, R. W., 2004, 'Detecting, understanding, and explaining animal imitation'. In: 
Perspectives on imitation: From mirror neurons to memes, edited by S. Hurley 
and N. Chater, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Cacioppo, J. T., and G. G. Berntson, eds. 2004. Essays in Social Neuroscience. Edited by 
J. T. Cacioppo and G. G. Berntson, Social Neuroscience Series. Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press. 
Stotz/Allen: From receptors to learning, 8/27/09 38 
Call, J., and M. Tomasello, 1996, 'The effects of humans on the cognitive development of 
apes.' In: Reaching into Thought, edited by A. E. Russon, K. A. Bard and S. T. 
Parker, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
———, 1998, 'Distinguishing intentional from accidental actions in orangutans (Pongo 
pygmaeus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens)', 
Journal for Comparative Psychology, 112:192-206. 
Carmichael, L., 1925, 'Heredity and Environment: Are they antithetical?' Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 20:245-260. 
Castellucci, V., H. Pinsker, I. Kupfermann, and E. R. Kandel, 1970, 'Neuronal 
mechanisms of habituation and dishabituation of the gill-withdrawal reflex in 
Aplysia ', Science, 167 (926):1745-8. 
Chwang, W. B., K. J. O’Riordan, J. M. Levenson, and J. D. Sweatt, 2006, 'ERK/MAPK 
regulates hippocampal histone phosphorylation following contextual fear 
conditioning', Learning and Memory, 13:322-328. 
Dretske, F., 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Fodor, J. A., 1975, The Language of Thought, New York: Crowell. 
Freeberg, T. M., M. J. West, A. P. King, S. D. Duncan, and D. R. Sengelaub, 2002, 
'Cultures, genes, and neurons in the development of song and singing in brown-
headed cowbirds (Molothrus ater)', Journal of Comparative Physiology, 188:993-
1002. 
Furlong, E. E., K. J. Boose, and S. T. Boysen, 2008, 'Raking it in: the impact of 
enculturation on chimpanzee tool use', Animal Cognition, 11 (1):83-97. 
Gácsi, M., G. B., Z. Virányi, E. Kubinyi, B. Belényi, and Á. Miklósi, Forthcoming, 
'Selection for Developmental Shift Explains Dog-Wolf Difference in Utilizing 
Human Pointing Gestures', PLoSONE. 
Gilbert, S., and D. Epel, 2009, Ecological Developmental Biology: Integrating 
Epigenetics, Medicine, and Evolution, Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates. 
Gilbert, S. F., 2001, 'Ecological Developmental Biology: Developmental Biology meets 
the Real World', Developmental Biology, 233:1-22. 
———, 2003, 'The reactive genome'. In: Origination of Organismal Form: Beyond the 
Gene in Developmental and Evolutionary Biology, edited by G. B. Müller and S. 
A. Newman, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Ginsburg, S., and E. Jablonka, 2009, 'Epigenetic Learning in Non-Neural Organisms', 
Journal of Bioscience, 34 (4):xxx-xxx. 
Gottlieb, G., 2001, 'A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View: Early 
Formulation and Current Status'. In: Cycles of Contingency: Developmental 
Systems and Evolution, edited by S. Oyama, P. E. Griffiths and R. D. Gray, 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Grau, J. W., E. D. Crown, A. R. Ferguson, S. N. Washburn, M. A. Hook, and R. C. 
Miranda, 2006, 'Instrumental learning within the spinal cord: Underlying 
mechanisms and implications for recovery after injury', Behavioral and Cognitive 
Neuroscience Reviews, 5:191-239. 
Grau, J. W., and R. L. Joynes, 2005, ' A neural-functionalist approach to learning', 
International Journal of Comparative Psychology, 18:1-22. 
———, 2005, 'Neurofunctionalism revisited: Learning is more than you think it is', 
International Journal of Comparative Psychology, 18:46-59. 
Stotz/Allen: From receptors to learning, 8/27/09 39 
Griffiths, P. E., 2002, 'What is Innateness?' The Monist, 85 (1):70-85. 
———, 2004, 'Instinct in the '50s: The British reception of Konrad Lorenz's Theory of 
Instinctive Behaviour', Biology and Philosophy, 19 (4):609-631. 
Griffiths, P. E., and R. D. Gray, 2005, 'Three Ways to Misunderstand Developmental 
Systems Theory', Biology & Philosophy, 20 (2):417-425. 
Griffiths, P. E., and K. Stotz, 2000, 'How the Mind Grows: A Developmental Perspective 
on the Biology of Cognition', Synthese, 122 (1-2):29-51. 
Herrmann, E., J. Call, M. V. Hernandez-Lloreda, B. Hare, and M. Tomasello, 2007, 
'Humans have evolved specialized skills of social cognition: the Cultural 
Intelligence Hypothesis', Science, 317:1360-66. 
Inouea, S., and T. Matsuzawa, 2007, 'Working memory of numerals in chimpanzees', 
Current Biology, 17 (23):R1004-R1005. 
Jablonka, E., and M. J. Lamb, 2005, Evolution in Four Dimenesions: Genetic, 
Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life., 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Johnston, T., 2002, 'An early manuscript in the history of American comparative 
psychology. Lewis Henry Morgan's Animal Psychology', History of Psychology, 
5 (4):323-355. 
Johnston, T. D., 2001, 'Towards a systems view of development: An appraisal of 
Lehrman's critique of Lorenz'. In: Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems 
and Evolution, edited by S. Oyama, P. E. Griffiths and R. D. Gray, Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press. 
Jones, S. S., 2005, 'Why don’t apes ape more?' In: Perspectives on imitation: From 
cognitive neuroscience to social science, edited by S. Hurley and N. Chater, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Keller, E. F., 2000, The Century of the Gene, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Kumashiro, M., H. Ishibashi, Y. Uchiyama, S. Itakura, A. Murata, and A. Iriki, 2003, 
'Natural imitation induced by joint attention in Japanese monkeys', International 
Journal of Psychophysiology, 50:81-99. 
Kuryatov, A., B. Laube, H. Betz, and J. Kuhse, 1994, 'Mutational analysis of the glycine-
binding site of the NMDA receptor: structural similarity with bacterial amino 
acid-binding proteins', Neuron, 12 (6):1291-300. 
Lehrman, D. S., 1953, 'Critique of Konrad Lorenz's theory of instinctive behavior', 
Quarterly Review of Biology, 28 (4):337-363. 
———, 1970, 'Semantic & conceptual issues in the nature-nurture problem'. In: 
Development & Evolution of Behaviour, edited by D. S. Lehrman, San Francisco: 
W. H. Freeman and co. 
Lewontin, R. C., 2000, The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and Environment, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Lloyd, E. A., 2004, 'Kanzi, evolution, and language', Biology & Philosophy, 19:577-588. 
Lyon, P. 2006. The Agent in the Organism: Towards a Biogenic Theory of Cognition. 
PhD Australian National University. 
Maestripieri, D., and J. M. Mateo, 2009, Maternal Effects in Mammals, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Maienschein, J. 2005. Epigenesis and Preformationism. Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epigenesis/. 
Stotz/Allen: From receptors to learning, 8/27/09 40 
Maturana, H. R., and F. J. Varela, 1980, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of 
the Living, New York: Springer. 
McGonigle, B., and M. Chalmers, 2001, 'The Growth of Cognitive Structure in Monkeys 
and Men'. In: Animal Cognition and Sequential Behavior: Behavioral, Biological, 
and Computational Perspectives, edited by S. B. Fountain, M. D. Bunsey, J. H. 
Danks and M. K. McBeath, New York: Springer. 
McGonigle, B. O., and M. Chalmers, 2001, 'The growth of cognitive structures in 
Monkeys and Men'. In: Animal Cognition and Sequential Behaviour. 
Behavioural, Biological and Computational Perspectives, edited by S. B. 
Fountain, M. D. Bunsey, J. H. Danks and M. K. McBeath, Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publisher. 
———, 2008, 'Putting Descartes before the horse (again!). Commentary on Penn, D., 
Povinelli, D.J and Holyoak, K.J.' Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 31 (2):142-143. 
Meaney, M. J., 2001, 'Maternal care, gene expression, and the transmission of individual 
differences in stress reactivity across generations.' Annual Review Neuroscience, 
24:1161-92. 
Michel, G. F., and C. L. Moore, 1995, Developmental Psychobiology : An 
interdisciplinary science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Miller, C. A., S. L. Campbell, and J. D. Sweatt, 2008, 'DNA methylation and histone 
acetylation work in concert to regulate memory formation and synaptic plasticity', 
Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 89:599-603. 
Moore, C. L., 1984, 'Maternal contributions to the development of masculine sexual 
behavior in laboratory rats', Developmental Psychobiology, 17 (4):347-356. 
———, 2003, 'Differences between organism-environment systems conceived by 
Lehrman and Gibson: What's in the nest of reciprocities matters', Developmental 
Psychobiology, 42 (4):349-56. 
Moss, L., 2001, 'Deconstructing the gene and reconstructing molecular develomental 
systems'. In: Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems and Evolution, 
edited by S. Oyama, P. E. Griffiths and R. D. Gray, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
Mousseau, T. A., and C. W. Fox, eds. 1998. Maternal Effects as Adaptations. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Nathanielsz, P. W., and K. L. Thornburg, 2003, 'Fetal programming: from gene to 
functional systems –an overview', Journal of Physiology, 547:3-4. 
Newman, S. A., 2003, 'From physics to development: the evolution of morphogenetic 
mechanisms'. In: Origination of Organismal Form: Beyond the Gene in 
Developmental and Evolutionary Biology, edited by G. B. Müller and S. A. 
Newman, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Noh, J., R. P. Sharma, M. Veldic, A. A. Salvacion, X. Jia, and Y. Chen, 2005, 'DNA 
methyltransferase 1 regulates reelin mRNA expression in mouse primary cortical 
cultures', PNAS, 102:1749 –1754. 
Oyama, S., 1999, 'The nurturing of natures'. In: On Human Nature. Anthropological, 
Biological and Philosophical Foundations, edited by A. Grunwald, M. Gutmann 
and E. M. Neumann-Held, New York: Springer. 
Oyama, S., P. E. Griffiths, and R. D. Gray, 2001, 'Introduction: What is developmental 
systems theory?' In: Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems and 
Stotz/Allen: From receptors to learning, 8/27/09 41 
Evolution, edited by S. Oyama, P. E. Griffiths and R. D. Gray, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
———, eds. 2001. Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems and Evolution. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Penn, D. C., K. J. Holyoak, and D. J. Povinelli, 2008, 'Darwin’s mistake: Explaining the 
discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds', Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 31 (2):109-129. 
Pigliucci, M., 2001, Phenotypic Plasticity: Beyond Nature and Nurture, Syntheses in 
Ecology and Evolution, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Robert, J. S., 2004, Embryology, Epigenesis and Evolution: Taking Development 
Seriously., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Saigusa, T., A. Tero, T. Nakagaki, and Y. Kuramoto, 2008, 'Amoebae Anticipate 
Periodic Events', Physical Review Letters, 100 (1):018101. 
Samuelson, L. K., and L. B. Smith, 2000, 'Grounding development in cognitive 
processes', Child Development, 71 (1):98-106. 
Savage-Rumbaugh, S., W. M. Fields, and T. Spircu, 2004, 'The emergence of knapping 
and vocal expression embedded in a Pan/Homo culture', Biology & Philosophy, 
19 (4):541-575. 
Shair, H. N., G. A. Barr, and H. A. Myron, eds. 1991. Developmental Psychobiology: 
New Methods and Changing Concepts. Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Shapiro, J. A., 2007, 'Bacteria are small but not stupid: cognition, natural genetic 
engineering and socio-bacteriology', Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 38:807-819. 
Shettleworth, S. J., 1994, 'Biological approaches to the study of learning'. In: Handbook 
of Perception and Cognition, edited by N. J. Mackintosh, London: Academic 
Press. 
Smith, L. B., and C. Breazeal, 2007, 'The dynamic lift of develpmental process', 
Developmental Science, 10 (1):61-68. 
Spencer, J. P., D. Corbetta, P. Buchanan, M. Clearfield, B. Ulrich, and G. Schöner, 2006, 
'Moving toward a Grand Theory of Development: In memory o Esther Thelen', 
Child Development, 77 (6):1521-1538. 
Stopher, M. A., E. A. Marcus, T. C. Nolen, C. H. Rankin, and T. J. Carew, 1991, 
'Learning and memory in Aplysia: A combined developmental and simple 
systems approach'. In: Developmental Psychobiology: New Methods and 
Changing Concepts, edited by H. N. Shair, G. A. Barr and H. A. Myron, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Stotz, K., 2006, 'Molecular epigenesis: distributed specificity as a break in the Central 
Dogma’', History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 28 (4):527-544. 
Tagkopoulos, I., Y. Liu, and S. Tavazoie, 2008, 'Predictive behavior within microbial 
genetic networks', Science, 320:1313-1317. 
Thelen, E., 1995, 'Time-scale dynamics and the development of an embodied cognition'. 
In: Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition, edited by R. F. 
Port and T. van Gelder, Cambridge, M.A: MIT Press. 
Thorndike, E. L., 1911, Animal Intelligence, Darien, CT: Hafner. 
Stotz/Allen: From receptors to learning, 8/27/09 42 
Timberlake, W., 2002, 'Niche-related learning in laboratory paradigms: the case of maze 
behavior in Norway rats', Behavioural Brain Research 134, 134:355-374. 
Tomasello, M., 1999, The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Tomasello, M., and J. Call, 2004, 'The role of humans in the cognitive development of 
apes revisited', Animal Cognition, 7:213-215. 
West, M. J., 2003, 'The case for developmental ecology', Animal Behaviour, 66:617-622. 
West, M. J., and A. P. King, 1987, 'Settling Nature and Nurture into an Ontogenetic 
Niche', Developmental Psychobiology, 20 (5):549-562. 
———, 2008, 'Deconstructing innate illusions: Reflections on nature-nurture-niche from 
an unlikely source', Philosophical Psychology, 21 (3 (Special Issue, Reconciling 
Nature and Nurture in the study of Cognition and Behavior)):383-395. 
West, M. J., A. P. King, and A. A. Arberg, 1988, 'The Inheritance of Niches'. In: 
Handbook of Behavioral Neurobiology, edited by E. M. Blass: Plenum Press. 
West, M. J., A. P. King, and M. A. Duff, 1990, 'Communicating about Communicating: 
When Innate Is Not Enough', Developmental Psychobiology, 23 (7):585-598. 
West-Eberhard, M. J., 2003, Developmental Plasticity and Evolution, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Wood, M. A., J. D. Hawk, and T. Abel, 2006, 'Combinatorial chromatin modifications 
and memory storage: A code for memory?' Learning and Memory, 13 (21-244). 
Zimmer, C., 2008, Microcosm: E. coli and the New Science of Life, New York: Pantheon 
Books. 
 
 
 
